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Abstract
In this paper we examine the consequences of having a Central Bank
whose preferences are state contingent. This has been identi…ed in the lit-
erature as a Central Bank that is ‘rationally inattentive’ or ‘constructively
ambiguous’. The new feature in this paper is that we show how the private
sector is likely to react. There are two possibilities: the public can form
rational expectations and internalise the uncertainty about the Central
Bank’s preferences in full. Alternatively, and if this process of internal-
isation is costly, it can form a ‘best’ guess regarding those preferences
and use that. This implies a certainty equivalence strategy. We examine
the magnitude of the resulting error in in‡ation and output, following
the assumption of certainty equivalence. Under all reasonable levels of
uncertainty this error turns out to be small. But it involves trading a
de‡ation bias against the cost of gathering the information needed for the
full rational expectations solution.
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1 Introduction
There are circumstances in which the work of Central Banks will be conducted
under a regime of incomplete transparency for the private sector. Incomplete
transparency may occur either because the bank itself chooses not to reveal
certain aspects of what it knows; or because it does not have …rm information
itself, and is therefore unable to reveal that information precisely. The empirical
implications of the di¤erent sources of intransparency are shown to be diverse
(Demertzis and Hughes Hallett, 2002, 2003).
The …rst case is the traditional one, in which the private sector faces pref-
erence uncertainty or control errors (incomplete political and economic trans-
parency, respectively) and has been studied by many authors [inter alia, Faust
and Svensson (2001, 2002), Geraats (2002), Muscatelli (1998), Sibert (2002),
Walsh (1999)].
The second type of intransparency can be associated with potentially time in-
consistent preferences in which the parameters applied by the Central Bank
(CB) are state contingent, randomised or otherwise varied. In that case the
Central Bank is unable to announce in advance exactly what values might be
taken at any speci…c time. This kind of model has not been widely studied, but
examples may be found in the Rational Inattention model of Sims (2003) and
the Constructive Ambiguity approach of Cukierman-Metlzer (1986).
In this paper, we assume that there is uncertainty about what the Central
Bank preferences really are, and examine the way the private sector handles
this lack of transparency, irrespective of how it arises. In most of the studies
undertaken, it is assumed that the private sector is unable to internalise the
full e¤ects of the uncertainty it faces. This may happen either because it does
not realise that the Central Bank may rationally be uncertain itself; or because
it may not have su¢cient information to characterise that uncertainty fully; or
because it is too expensive to do so accurately, and forms a …rst order certainty
equivalent (FOCE) estimate of what the Bank is likely to deliver instead. The
consequence of such simpli…cations, realistic as they may be in terms of how
people actually act, is systematic errors in private sector forecasts of in‡ation
or the output gap. In order to evaluate these costs we compare the resulting
in‡ation rate to that achieved when the private sector is fully rational and the
costs of any remaining lack of transparency are fully internalised. We …nd that
under reasonable levels of intransparency, the costs of following a regime of
certainty equivalence are small. If the costs of acquiring the extra information
that will allow rational expectations to be formed are relatively high, then a
regime of certainty equivalence may remain the optimal strategy.
We start from the observation that, unless there are very distinct gains from
investing the resources needed to estimate (or obtain information on) the ex-
act distribution of the parameters of the Central Bank’s preferences, it may be
simpler for the private sector to adopt FOCE estimates of the relevant para-
meters. Section 2 provides a summary of how this is justi…ed in the literature,
with the aid of a standard set-up, and section 3.1 presents its solution. We then
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look at the scope for, and the consequences of, internalising the e¤ects of the
uncertainty the private sector faces, as that leads to the rational expectations
solution in section 3.2. We compare the two in section 3.3. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Set Up
We adopt a simple Rogo¤ (1985) type model of a conservative central banker
in which the Central Bank has the following ob jective function1 :
L =
1
2
E
h
¼2 + b (y ¡ k)2
i
(1)
constrained by a simple Lucas supply function:
y = ¼ ¡ ¼e + " (2)
where y and ¼ are measured as deviations from their steady state paths2 . The
model produces the following solutions for the policy variables in question:
¼ = bk ¡ b
1 + b
"
¼e = bk (3)
y =
1
1 + b
"
For simplicity, we assume that there is only one (monetary) policy authority in
the game. There is therefore, no …scal policy and we assume for simplicity that
there is no uncertainty about the policy transmission mechanism.
But what would happen if the Bank itself was unsure about the precise value
of b at any particular moment; or was unable to commit itself to one particular
value of b for all circumstances? This may fall under the heading of rational
inattention or constructive ambiguity. In fact the literature contains a number
of models which explain why policy makers may be uncertain about which prior-
ities to set for any particular problem. The …rst is when their relative priorities
(the marginal rates of substitution between ¼ and y) are state dependent. That
would happen if the true preferences (over the entire policy space) were more
complicated than those represented by a simple quadratic loss function. In that
case, (1) represents a local approximation for the current position of the econ-
omy; and, being dependent on the uncertain values of ¼ and y, the marginal
1 This system of objectives in in‡ation and output gaps is based on the utility-based ap-
proach by Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) and Gali and Monacelli (2002).
2 The microfoundations of this model were originally derived by Lucas, (1972, 1973). Ex-
tensions to his model, to incorporate …scal policy appear in Hughes Hallett and Viegi (2003).
To justify the presence of k, a target deviation from the steady state, see the discussions by
Rogo¤ (1985), Blinder (1997). Furthermore, as the literature remains ambiguous about the
use of k, Demertzis and Hughes Hallett (2002) recognise it explicitly as a source of uncertainty.
For our purposes however, it is su¢cient to note that k might be either positive or zero.
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rate of transformation between them (and hence the desired value of b) will be-
come a random variable (Hughes Hallett 1979). The same will happen if policy
makers wish to retain an element of risk aversion in their preferences since the
strict linear-quadratic framework adopted here will generate risk neutral deci-
sions. There is also a possibility that policy makers cannot always specify their
relative priorities in advance, but have to uncover them iteratively by revealed
preference (van Eijck and Sandee, 1959).
Recent theory has provided several other reasons why b might be uncertain. The
…rst is to preserve risk sensitivity in a linear-quadratic approach. This can be
done by minimising the mean and variance of (1), ®E(L)+ (1 ¡ ®)V (L), where
® is a coe¢cient of risk sensitivity and V (L) is fourth order in ¼ and y (Hughes
Hallett, 1984a). That in turn is a truncation of the full risk averse decision
making solution devised by Whittle (1982). From here, it is straight forward
to show that risk sensitive decision making is equivalent to having solved the
linear-quadratic problem (1) sub ject to (2), where b is replaced by
b
·
® + (1 ¡ ®) b¾22
® + (1 ¡ ®) b¾21
¸
with ¾21 = V (y) and ¾22 = V (¼). If the degree of risk sensitivity ® (the curvature
of the ‘true’ preferences) is state dependent, then the new value of b will be
uncertain too.
A second version of this idea is to note that the ‘robust control’ approach used
by Hansen and Sargent (2002), Hansen et al (1999), Basar and Bernhard (1995)
and others, is equivalent to minimising (1) minus a term in the variance in the
state variable y. Again, if the degree of risk sensitivity (the Lagrange multiplier
attached to that extra variance term) is state dependent, the implied change to
the value of b will be uncertain ex ante. But that, as Kasa (2002) points out, is
also identical to the model of ‘rational inattention’ introduced by Sims (2003).
Here the problem is one in which policy makers have a limited capacity to
monitor all the variables in the economy. They will rationally reduce the e¤ort
made to forecast and control the most volatile of them in order to concentrate
on those that can be controlled e¤ectively. As Sims shows, that is a problem
which can be solved by minimising (1), less a term in the variance of the state
variable which is subject to a monitoring constraint. That implies a one-to-one
correspondence with our robust control problem. Hence rational inattention is
an other reason for supposing that b would be uncertain ex ante.
Finally, the best known model of preference uncertainty is one in which policy
makers deliberately retain ‘randomised’ preferences in order to exploit the ef-
fects of ambiguity (Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986). Normally this is modelled
as a process of control errors in monetary policy. But, in order to generate
those errors systematically and to their advantage, policy makers need to cre-
ate shifts in their relative preferences for output stabilisation and in‡ation in
a favourable manner and with suitable timing. Because that shift is random
but with persistence, policy makers can a¤ect the speed with which the private
sector becomes aware of it. That then allows the Central Bank to choose its mo-
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ment for monetary policy changes. For example, it may plan a positive surprise
to stimulate the economy when output is down; but with expectations lagging
and not being certain what the Bank’s true intentions are, the private sector
will not anticipate a rise in in‡ation. The stimulus can therefore, be achieved
at lower cost in terms of in‡ation. Conversely, negative surprises can be timed
to reduce in‡ation without the private sector anticipating a loss in output. But
to gain these advantages, the Bank must allow the precise value of b to remain
uncertain.
We model the existence of incomplete transparency as uncertainty in the Central
Bank’s true preference for output stabilisation, as follows:
b = ¯ + u with E(u) = 0 and V (u) = ¾2u (4)
Full transparency (or full clarity) will require both E(u) = 0 as well as ¾2u = 0.
From here we can distinguish two cases:
² The …rst is where, for lack of accurate information on the characteristics
of the entire probability distribution being used by the Central Bank to
generate b, the private sector considers the mean of that distribution,
E(b) = ¯, to be the actual preference parameter. This constitutes its best
guess or ‘consensus estimate’ when it cannot evaluate the distribution of b
more precisely. Equally, this estimate can be used to generate …rst order
certainty equivalent approximations to the Bank’s best decisions when the
higher order moments of the b distribution are unknown; or are considered
di¢cult or too expensive to estimate accurately. This will be identi…ed as
the Certainty Equivalence case.
² The second case is where the private sector can and does make the e¤ort to
evaluate the higher moments of the b distribution. In that case, the private
sector is able to evaluate the Bank’s optimal decision rules accurately.
Similarly, the Bank, which also knows the distribution of b, conditions its
decisions on the private sector’s improved information. We suppose that
they both do that3 and call this the Rational Expectations case.
The Central Bank is fully aware of (4) in either case, and can correctly identify
the regime that the private sector follows.
3 So long as we deal with the linear-quadratic case as speci…ed here, we only need the …rst
two moments of the b distribution to do all that. A non-linear set-up however, would require
the private sector to have access to all the higher order moments of the distribution of b
(Hughes Hallett, 1984b, p39).
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3 The Consequences of Ambiguity in Monetary
Policy
3.1 A Certainty Equivalent Solution
As argued above, if the private sector does not have accurate information on the
moments of the distribution of b or …nds it too expensive (relative to the poten-
tial bene…ts in terms of improved decision making) to obtain that information,
then adopting a certainty equivalent approach is the best it can do. In that
case, taking the mean of that distribution E(b) = ¯ as its certainty equivalent
(‘best estimate’) and using (3), the private sector will expect the Central Bank
to implement the following policy rule:
¼ = ¯k ¡ ¯"
1 + ¯
(5)
which implies ¼eC E = ¯k is the in‡ation expectation in the markets. In fact,
in view of (7) and (8) below, we can see that ¼eC E is the …rst order certainty
equivalent estimate of the optimal policy rule when b and " are uncorrelated. But
it is also a biased estimate, as (9) will show. The Central Bank now optimises
the following loss function
min
¼
L =
1
2
E
h
¼2 + b (¼ ¡ ¯k + " ¡ k)2
i
(6)
Since ¼ is a choice entirely within the Bank’s control, the result is:
¼¤CE =
b(1 + ¯)k
1 + b
¡ b"
1 + b
(7)
But, notice that E(¼¤CE) 6= bk or ¯k, since
E
µ
b
1 + b
¶
6= ¯
1 + ¯
(8)
In fact, taking expectations, we get (approximately),
E(¼¤CE) = ¯k ¡ ¾
2
uk
(1 + ¯)2
< ¯k = ¼ eCE (9)
assuming, again, b and " to be independent. Equation (9) has four immediate
implications: a) the average level of in‡ation is a¤ected by imperfect trans-
parency; b) greater transparency will increase average in‡ation; c) the private
sector will consistently overestimate in‡ation; d) the Bank will have an incen-
tive to preserve some ambiguity (or incomplete transparency) since that will
deliver lower in‡ation than anticipated, on average. Unfortunately it will also
reduce average output, as we show below. Nevertheless, a conservative central
bank (b < 1) and a conservative population would regard this lower in‡ation as
more important than the loss in output. Hence we may say that ambiguity is
constructive in this case.
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To see exactly what happens to output, we substitute (7) into (2) where ¼eC E =
¯k:
y¤CE =
b(1 + ¯)k
1 + b
¡ b"
1 + b
¡ ¯k + " = uk + "
1 + b
(10)
This implies, that the average level of output will also be a¤ected by a lack of
clarity:
E(y¤CE) = ¡
k¾2u
(1 + ¯)2
(11)
In fact there is a de‡ation bias here, E(y¤) < 0, which decreases with greater
transparency. This acts as a restraint on the incentive to create lower average
in‡ation rates by retaining some ambiguity in the Central Bank’s preferences.
Moreover, it implies that there will be an optimal level of ambiguity if b < 1
and k2=¾2" is not too small4 .
3.2 The Rational Expectations Solution
We assume next that the private sector now recognises that its certainty equiva-
lent approximation to the Bank’s behaviour leads to biased forecasts of in‡ation.
Given information on the distribution of b, as supplied by the Bank or obtained
from its own research, the private sector knows the Bank will solve (1) sub ject
to (2) to obtain
¼ =
b
1 + b
(¼e ¡ " + k) (12)
The di¤erence now is in the way that the private sector forms its expectations.
This is done by taking expectations through (12), and solving for the new value
of ¼ e. This yields the rationally expected in‡ation rate as
¼eRE =
"
(1 + ¯ )2 ¡ ¾2u=¯
(1 + ¯)2 + ¾2u
#
¯k = µ¯k (13)
Notice that µ < 1 if ¾2u 6= 0; but that µ ! 1 if ¾2u = 0 and as ¯ increases without
limit. But µ may turn negative if ¯ becomes very small (¯ ! 0): although
that can only happen if ¾2u 6= 05 . This allows us to measure the proportional
error in expected in‡ation6 that the private sector would obtain in the certainty
equivalence case,
(1 ¡ µ)¯k
¯k
=
¾2u (1 + ¯)
¯
h
(1 + ¯)2 + ¾2u
i > 0 (14)
4 If k2=¾2" were small, there would be little space for reducing in‡ation and little cost in
output. The gains from ambiguity would be rather small in that case.
5 In fact, µ < 0 only if ¾2u > ¯ (1 + ¯)
2 . However, if this happens because ¯ is small, instead
of ¾2u being large, then ¼
e
CE ! ¼eRE ! 0.
6 This is calculated as ¼
e
CE¡¼eRE
¼eCE
.
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which vanishes if ¾2u ! 0 but increases if ¯ ! 0. This implies ¼ eRE < ¼eCE , as
noted earlier.
To obtain the actual in‡ation outcome in this case, we substitute (13) into (12)
¼¤RE =
b (1 + µ¯)k
1 + b
¡ b"
1 + b
(15)
and hence obtain
E (¼¤RE) =
"
¯ ¡ ¾
2
u
(1 + ¯)2
# ·
1 + µ¯
1 + ¯
¸
k (16)
It is straight forward to show that (16) is indeed equal to (13), consistent with
rational expectations. Given (9), the proportional error in actual in‡ation in the
certainty equivalence solution, compared the rational expectations equilibrium,
now is7
(1 ¡ µ)¯
1 + ¯
=
¾2u
(1 + ¯)2 + ¾2u
> 0 (17)
on average. Hence E (¼¤RE) < E (¼¤C E)8 . Notice that this error also vanishes
as ¾2u ! 0 or as ¯ increases, but rises if ¯ becomes smaller. Finally, and
most important, the fact that (17) and (14) are both positive means that the
proportional forecasting error - and hence the incentive for the private sector
to change from the certainty equivalent solution to this one - is the di¤erence
between the two: ¾2u=
h
¯
³
(1 + ¯ )2 + ¾2u
´i
.
As regards output, using (15) and (2), we have
y¤RE =
uk + (1 ¡ µ) ¯k + "
1 + b
(18)
and hence, using (17), that
E (y¤RE) = 0 (19)
This implies E (y¤CE) < E (y¤RE) = 0: the de‡ation bias has be removed.
In the next section, we provide some idea of the numerical importance of the
di¤erence between these two solutions, and hence of the incentive to shift from
certainty equivalence to a full rational expectations solution with its more ex-
acting information requirements. It will also give an indication of the incentive,
faced by the Central Bank, to provide full information about the likely value of
b, in the interest of better economic performance. In turns out both incentives
7 This is calculated as E(¼
¤
CE)¡E(¼¤RE)
E(¼¤CE)
.
8 Note that the errors in the expectations go in the same direction as the ‘errors’ in the
outcomes, but are bigger.
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are pretty small. Constructive ambiguity, with its implication that expecta-
tions can be ‘manipulated’ to produce lower in‡ation rates (at the cost of some
de‡ation bias), may therefore, seem attractive. That has been the traditional
argument9 . However, although in‡ation can indeed be restrained in this way,
it can be reduced even further with full information or transparency, and at
no cost in terms of a de‡ationary bias. So constructive ambiguity is a false
expedient - except in so far as it may cost too much to gather or circulate the
relevant information on b. In that situation, the RE solution is not realistic and
ambiguity may well be a useful expedient for the Central Bank. That is the real
message of this paper.
3.3 How Large are the Errors if the Private Sector As-
sumes Certainty Equivalence?
Certainty Equivalence, in which ¯ = E(b) is taken as a …xed value representing
Central Bank preferences, is the standard assumption in the existing literature
on constructive ambiguity. It says that, in the absence of accurate information
on the entire distribution which the Central Bank may decide to use for b, the
private sector will take a …rst order certainty equivalent estimate of the full
rational expectations equilibrium. That is a sensible strategy if the expecta-
tional errors (¼eC E 6= E (¼¤C E)) are small in relation to the cost of gathering the
information necessary to support the full rational expectations equilibrium.
How big might the errors be under Certainty Equivalence?
Case a). Systematic errors in expectations are the key determinant of which
solution would be chosen in practice, since the private sector has no interest
beyond being able to forecast the Central Bank’s decisions accurately. As the
private sector leads, once it has decided which expectations solution to follow,
the Central Bank is locked in - except in so far as the Bank may decide to supply
the private sector with enough information to get an equilibrium which , in its
own estimate, it thinks is superior or more stable.
Suppose the Central Bank chooses b to be distributed uniformly on the unit
interval. This implies a certain degree of conservatism, with ¯ = 0:5 and ¾2u =
1=12. Compared to the correct rational expectation (¼eRE), ¼ eCE will be too high
by 7.5 per cent. As a result, the Central Bank will end up choosing in‡ation
rates that are higher, on average, than those in the full rational expectations
solution by 3.6 per cent 10 . Consequently the private sector will …nd itself making
systematic errors in its forecasts of in‡ation of just 3.9 per cent on average.
By way of an example, if the correct expectations, ¼eRE , were 2 per cent, the
private sector would be expecting an in‡ation rate of 2.15 per cent and the
Central Bank would end up choosing to have average in‡ation 0.07 percentage
points higher than it needed to have. The forecasting error then observed by
the private sector would 0.08 percentage points. Errors of that scale are hardly
9 Issing (1999), Cuckierman and Meltzer (1986).
10 These …gures are derived from (14) and (17) respectively and re‡ect proportional errors -
not percentage points.
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likely to generate great pressures for a switch to the expense of computing the
full rational expectations solution.
Even in a country where the correct underlying in‡ation rate is 10 per cent, the
private sector and the Central Bank would get ¼ values that were too high by
0.4 percentage points. However, if the underlying rate were 20 per cent, then
their errors begin to approach 1 percentage point. Incomplete transparency and
ambiguity may therefore become more of a contentions issue in middle-to-high
in‡ation countries. The Central Bank may see greater advantages in ambiguity
because of the ability to manipulate expectations and average in‡ation down-
wards; and also to build its reputation for discipline by creating errors in which
in‡ation outcomes consistently come out lower than expectations. It is natural
that the private sector will see disadvantages in its own persistent errors and
the de‡ation biases that they imply. However, the Central Bank will lead in
this case since the process of learning is of little immediate value.
Case b). Suppose more realistically, that the Central Bank chooses b from a
normal distribution such that it can be 99 per cent certain to remain in‡ation
averse (conservative) at all times. Assuming the same mean, this implies b »
N (0:5; 0:028), with 99 per cent of the distribution in the unit interval. In this
case, private sector expectations, ¼eCE , will be in error (too high) by 3.7 per cent
and E (¼¤CE) higher than the rational equilibrium solution by 1.2 per cent. The
private sector then faces systematic errors in the in‡ation forecasts of just 2.4
per cent.
These results show that, if the Central Bank were persuaded that it should
be in‡ation averse under all circumstances, then the di¤erence between the
certainty equivalent and the full rational expectations solutions would be rather
small: probably 3-4 per cent in the private sector expectations; and one half
to one third of that in the Central Bank’s assessment of the in‡ation rates it
can achieve on average. That means the forecasting errors made by the private
sector would be small: typically 2-3 per cent of the actual in‡ation outcomes.
These errors are almost certainly small enough to be ignored. Indeed if the
costs of monitoring the ECB or ‘Fed Watching’ were greater than 2.4 per cent
of the private sector’s research budget - which seems highly likely - then it might
actually be rational to do so. In that case, it is unlikely that the private sector
will be under any real pressure to adopt the rational expectations solution -
unless the Central Bank decides, out of self-interest, to provide the necessary
information on the distribution of b for free.
Case c). With respect to output, the potential de‡ation bias (output loss)
in the certainty equivalence solution, as a proportion of the target level for
stabilising output, is
E (y¤RE) ¡ E (y¤CE)
k
=
¾2u
(1 + ¯)2
> 0
which shows that the bias is eliminated in the rational expectations solution.
Evaluating this expression for the case of uniformly distributed b values, we …nd
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the certainty equivalent solution leads to a de‡ation bias of 0.22 per cent in
output target units. If preferences are normally distributed, the bias would be
0.074 per cent.
4 Conclusions
Full transparency is unequivocally the desired result. In‡ation, is at its lowest
(and the de‡ation bias is altogether eliminated) if the Central Bank supplies all
the necessary information about its intentions to the private sector; or if it could
persuade the private sector to invest the resources to collect that information.
Problems arise however, if the following occur: a) the gains from using a full
information/full transparency solution over the certainty equivalent case with
limited information are relatively small; the private sector would then be unlikely
to invest the money to gather su¢cient information;.b) even if it did attempt
to gather the necessary information, this may not be su¢ciently accurate (error
free); c) …nally, even if the Central Bank supplied the information, its credibility
may not be perfect - in which case the private sector may not accept that
information without question. In any of these cases, the Central Bank would
be forced onto the certainty equivalence solution. The losses, for either party,
would be small and can be minimised by maintaining ambiguity. Thus, if the
costs of ‘monitoring the Central Bank’ exceed the gains of a full transparency
solution, constructive ambiguity may indeed be the rational strategy.
1. Following this, our analysis then shows that strict in‡ation targeters and
very conservative Central banks will be tempted to be less than fully trans-
parent, and to maintain a degree of ambiguity in their decision making.
That will decrease average in‡ation E (¼¤C E) and its associated expecta-
tions ¼eCE , at the cost of a permanent de‡ation bias. The latter will be
relatively unimportant to a genuinely conservative Central Bank.
2. We have also found that E (¼¤RE) = ¼
e
RE < E (¼
¤
CE) < ¼
e
CE . But
E (y¤CE) < E (y
¤
RE) = 0. Hence conservative Central Banks face no trade-
o¤: full disclosure leads to lower in‡ation rates but no de‡ationary bias.
However, if the de‡ationary bias is unimportant to them, and if they are
continuously and very carefully monitored (because they are independent
of the political authorities), they may nevertheless face a temptation to
employ constructive ambiguity since that will produce a better in‡ation
performance than expected (E (¼¤C E) < ¼eCE) at an unimportant cost,
for as long as the private sector refrains from trying to learn. They may
also think it safer to do this if they think the private sector’s informa-
tion gathering is likely to be error-prone. That in practice, may be the
more persuasive case for retaining an element of ambiguity, or incomplete
transparency, in policy making.
3. A liberal Central Bank faces a much greater con‡ict because a) the de‡a-
tion bias would be more important to them (and larger if k is larger); b)
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the expectations error it could generate to bolster its reputation would be
smaller; c) the gap between E (¼¤RE) and E (¼¤CE) will be larger, meaning
that supplying fuller information to the private sector is more worthwhile.
On this view, strict in‡ation targeters and conservative Central Bankers are
likely to argue for constructive ambiguity (as they do, Issing 1999). But more
liberal Central Banks, or those with an asymmetric in‡ation target (such as the
Bank of England), or an explicit stabilisation mandate (the Federal Reserve),
would typically aim to become more transparent.
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